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Does China offer a new narrative and an alternative voice in International Relations? 
 
Olivier Sempiga 
 
Abstract 
 
For some scholars, International Relations (IR) theories possess universal explanatory power whereas 
for others Western (European-Atlantic) IR theories have hijacked other truths as if Western regimes of 
truths were universal. This led Western nations to embark on process of promoting liberal values in 
various parts of the world. Liberalism has ruled the world for many decades and has become the status 
quo. But with the rise of China –dubbed peaceful rise – there has been a kind of an “End to the End of 
History”. This paper seeks to answer the question: Does China offer a new narrative and an alternative 
voice in International Relations? Schools within IR have been calling for recognition of voices other 
than Western ones. Africa is one of those areas that are embracing the Chinese mode of proceeding 
and where the peaceful rise is beginning to havea great impact. Having suffered from colonialism and 
the consequent dire poverty and economic decline for so many decades and failing to fully embrace 
Western liberal principles, many African countries have turned East mainly to China since it conforms 
to their authoritarian nature and at the same time indicates that it is possible to have economic growth 
without democratizing. This paper will show how China although not yet ready to uproot the liberal 
order with another kind of order draws on those liberal values that benefits China but at the same time 
turning away those elements of liberalism that do not serve it. In the era of multiculturalism, it seems 
adequate to accommodate non-Western voices into IR discourse. China may not challenge the existing 
order through violent ways like other would-be hegemonies did. But through its peaceful 
rise/development and soft power, China is set not only to become a new hegemony but it will provide 
a new narrative and alternative voice in IR. I will first of all give a sketch of the emerging Chinese IR 
theory. I will then show how the Beijing Consensus challenged the Washington Consensus. With clear 
cut examples from African nations, I will present China’s model as a worthy alternative for African 
nations. The paper draws from my contact with Chinese workers in Africa and exposure to Chinese 
companies’ activities.  
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Introduction 
One school argues that International Relations (IR) theories possess universal explanatory power and 
that there is no need to pursue alternative theoretical formulations (Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003, 
19). Another school argues that Western (European-Atlantic) IR theories have dominated and even 
hijacked other truths as if Western regimes of truths were universal. In the era of multiculturalism, it 
seems adequate to accommodate non-Western voices into IR discourse. To do this is to acknowledge 
that the Chinese or African debate does not necessarily emulate the Western definition of IR theory 
and that there may be different perspectives other than Western. Although it is difficult to point to a 
Chinese IR per se, it is argued that there are more than one ways in which Chinese IR is perceived. 
Dominant approaches to studying Chinese IR place an emphasis on the nation-state as the level of 
analysis, and are built on statist and realist notions of IR. Another key dynamic in China’s IR is the 
relationship between local state actors, and international non-state actors (Breslin2002, 3-4). This 
paper aims at showing that although it is still at an early state China has started providing a new 
narrative in International Relations. There is no doubt whatsoever that IR has been dominated by 
Western IR theories. A kind of liberal order has become the status quo. Indeed, the post-Cold War has 
witnessed a triumph of liberal democracy as the best form of governing human kind and liberalism as 
the best way to advance economic growth of nations. One after the other, nations from the four corners 
of the world have embraced liberal democracy. Fukuyama even proclaimed the “End of History” after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. But with the rise of China –dubbed peaceful rise – there has been a 
kind of an “End to the End of History”. Schools within IR have been calling for recognition of voices 
other than Western ones. Post-colonialism proposes the integration of non-western voices into the 
process of IR theory formulation. To justify this endeavor, post‐ colonial scholars stress the 
incompatibility between “Western” theory and non‐ “Western” political and philosophical 
foundations. Heavily influenced by the Gramscian concept of hegemony, post‐ colonial studies in IR 
condemn the predominance of concepts defined from the perspectives of the leading powers in world 
affairs and demand a more pluralist, integrative IR framework (Noesselt2012, 8). The word “West” is 
often used in antithesis to the East, the Orient, and Islam. It is often invoked to refer to Europe and the 
United States.  
 
Africa is one of those areas that are embracing the Chinese mode of proceeding and where the 
peaceful rise is beginning to have a great impact. Having suffered from colonialism and the 
consequent dire poverty and economic decline for so many decades and failing to fully embrace 
Western liberal principles many African countries have turned East mainly to China since it conforms 
to their authoritarian nature and at the same time indicates that it is possible to have economic growth 
without democratizing. This U-turn taken by many African nations is due to a feeling of betrayal that 
was experienced under the infamous “Structural Adjustment Programs” imposed on African countries 
by the IMF and the World Bank in the 1980s under the umbrella of the Washington Consensus. 
Although the “Structural Adjustment Programs” were meant to revive economies of African countries, 
they resulted in failure. This economic failure that took place in other regions of the world like Latin 
America and Asia led people to question the Washington Consensus with its one-size-fit-all policies. 
Recently, Rodrik2006, 1argued that: “Nobody really believes in the Washington Consensus anymore. 
The question now is not whether the Washington Consensus is dead or alive; it is what will replace it. 
”China’s Beijing Consensus seemingly has provided an alternative to the Washington Consensus. 
Despite this peaceful rise of China it is not clear yet whether China will uproot the liberal order with 
another kind of order or try to fit into the liberal order. 
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I. Towards a Chinese IR theory  
For a long time, it was claimed that there was no systematic “Chinese” IR theory or “theory with 
Chinese characteristics” (Qin 2008, 1). The absence of a Chinese IR theory was mainly due to three 
factors: the unconsciousness of ‘international-ness’ in the traditional Chinese worldview, the 
dominance of the Western IR discourse in the Chinese academic community, and the absence of a 
consistent theoretical core in the Chinese IR research. A Chinese IR theory is likely and even 
inevitable to emerge along with the great economic and social transformation that China has been 
experiencing and by exploring the essence of the Chinese intellectual tradition (1). Even though IR 
debates in China are currently influenced by Western IR studies, the establishment of a theory with 
Chinese characteristics or Chinese school of IR is underway. For instance, scholars in favor of the 
formation of a Chinese school have exactly started to explore the Chinese intellectual tradition. They 
maintain that Chinese IR can be traced back to the Zhou dynasty, during which several small Chinese 
kingdoms contended for leadership and hegemony. During the autumn and spring period (770– 476 
B.C.) and the Warring States period (475–221 B.C.), multiple philosophical schools developed their 
readings on the state, the ruler and ways of governing. Instead of learning from the “Western” history 
of IR and memorizing the outcomes of the Eurocentric theory debates, scholars in favor of the 
formation of a “Chinese” school propose studying the constellations inside the tianxia, the Chinese 
concept of the “world” as “all under heaven,” during the Zhou dynasty (Noesselt 2012, 17).  
 
The world is interpreted in such a way as to find suitable national responses. In China the word theory 
has a predominantly practical orientation. The “official” Chinese understanding of the meaning and 
function of (IR) theory is as follows: A theory is a system of concepts and principles, a scientific 
theory is established on the basis of social practice and has been proved and verified by social practice, 
and is a correct reflection of the essence and laws of objective things. The significance of a scientific 
theory lies in its ability to guide human behavior (Wang 1994, 482). This definition has its roots in the 
Maoist era. In his writings “On Practice” and “On Contradiction,” Mao (2007) proposed a recursive 
interrelation between theory and practice:  
 
Discover the truth through practice, and again through practice verify and develop the 
truth. Start from perceptual knowledge and actively develop it into rational knowledge; 
then start from rational knowledge and actively guide revolutionary practice to change 
both the subjective and the objective world. Practice, knowledge, again practice, and 
again knowledge. This form repeats itself in endless cycles, and with each cycle the 
content of practice and knowledge rises to a higher level. …. such is the 
dialectical‐ materialist theory of the unity of knowing and doing (Mao 2007, 66). 
 
In the post‐ Maoist period, IR studies in China underwent an all‐ encompassing reorganization. Most 
institutes had been shut down during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). After 1978, they were 
reopened and Maoist ideas and Marxist‐ Leninist ideology were replaced with “Western” IR 
approaches. These approaches were regarded as universally valid analytical frameworks that would 
allow China to enact pragmatic and efficient foreign policy (Noesselt 2012, 13). 
 
The field of IR in China continues to be shaped by the cleavages that are manifested in the controversy 
regarding the internationalization/Westernization versus the indigenization/Sinization of IR theory 
(Geeraerts and Men 2001, 266). Since the late 1990s Chinese publications have started to use the 
expression “Chinese school” instead of stressing the particularity of China’s IR approach. The 
members of this school of (Chinese) thought do not negate the general ideas of “Western” IR, but, 
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inspired by the “English school,” try to enrich the existing frameworks and to add a new perspective to 
general IR. The “Chinese school” paradigm has, however, not replaced the search for IR “with 
Chinese characteristics” (Noesselt 2012, 16). Furthermore, Chinese scholars still disagree over the 
question of whether the focus of IR research and IR theory formulation in China should be Chinese 
foreign relations or international relations. In the recent past, most research has dealt with China’s 
foreign relations and China’s image in the world. As an element of foreign policy, the theory debate 
has to answer the “core question” of Chinese IR: it has to define the circumstances and conditions 
under which China’s reemergence, the “peaceful rise,” can be realized without encountering 
containment and balancing acts by other states (16). Chinese IR theory is definitely underway. This is 
also shown by the way China’s economic and cultural boom challenge the liberal order established by 
Western nations as the following section shows. 
 
II. The Washington Consensus and The Beijing Consensus: Liberal order versus “non-
liberal” order 
Liberalism has shaped the contemporary international system. Two different strands of liberalism, in 
particular, are relevant: one dating back to the early modern period emphasizing sovereignty and the 
equality of states. The 1648 Peace of Westphalia gave rise to the idea that states are the sole legitimate 
actors of the international political arena. Moreover, states are free and equal therein, meaning that 
each country is at liberty to choose its own social, political and economic system and that it has the 
right of non-interference by foreign states on domestic matters. The second strand of liberalism-led by 
the US - introduced norms of moral universalism, based on the liberal values of democracy and human 
rights. Since the beginning of the 20th century, the aim of promoting democracy abroad had been a 
core element in how the US exercises its international power. As the geographical reach of the US’ 
political influence expanded, democracy promotion became a major and eventually an integral part of 
US foreign policy. From the late 1970s, human rights promotion was added as an important twin 
objective to democracy promotion in US foreign policy. In the post-Cold War era, many other state 
actors, in particular the European Union (EU) and its member states have also fostered democracy and 
human rights internationally (Dams and van der Putten 2015, 8). 
 
The Washington Consensus is one of the methods the West adopted to promote liberal values abroad. 
Moreover, it was a reaction to the economic statism that dominated development economics in many 
developing countries for much of the post-war, post-colonial period and was developed initially as a 
reaction to the Latin American and African debt crisis in the early 1980s (Han 2016 2). It is 
characterized by the World Bank, IMF and western donor community conditionality, including 
restrictions on macro-economic policy, a reduction in public spending, commitments to transparency 
and accountability, and the holding of democratic elections (3). Although the term ‘Washington 
Consensus’ is no longer widely used and has been severely criticized, the US and other Western 
governments continue to promote openness of economic systems internationally and other liberal 
values like democracy (Dams and van der Putten2015, 10). China and the West have different views 
on the role of liberal values in international relations. Although liberal values and related norms play a 
significant role in the contemporary international system, China’s leaders have found ways for their 
country to exist and even thrive in such an environment, while at the same time keeping political and 
economic liberties highly constrained at the domestic level (5).  
 
Basing on survey data and archival sources, Huang argues that there exist two China models. One 
China model emphasized financial liberalization, support for private entrepreneurship, and some 
political liberalism. The other China model is more statist in orientation, putting the emphasis on 
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financial and political controls and favoring the state-owned enterprises at the expense of private 
entrepreneurship. Roughly speaking, the first China model, which prevailed in the 1980s, was quite 
close to many of the prescriptions embodied in the Washington Consensus. The second China model 
which is called the Beijing Consensus has prevailed since the early 1990s (Huang 2010, 33). 
According to the Beijing Consensus, China’s rapid growth was enabled by its authoritarian political 
system (Huang 2010, 40). China is not a liberal democracy and its economy remains firmly controlled 
by the state. China’s approach to liberalism in international relations is not one of wholehearted 
acceptation, but of pragmatism. This pragmatism has so far resulted in a certain degree of adaptation 
(Dams and van der Putten 2015, 15).  
 
The phrase “Beijing Consensus” is used as an alternative to the Washington Consensus for nations that 
were trying to see how best to develop their economies. The Beijing Consensus consists of three 
theorems involving innovation; measures that focus on quality of life where sustainability and equality 
become first considerations; and self-determination. Self-determination would allow developing 
nations to develop relations on equal footing with big powers (Han 2016, 3). The theorem of self-
determination gives an idea of the Beijing Consensus as a model of development based on a strictly 
classic notion of sovereignty (Abad 2010, 49). As we will see in the following section on how China 
relates with Africa, sovereignty forms a cornerstone of China’s relationship with other nations. The 
Beijing Consensus is predicated on non-interference in domestic affairs. Unlike the Washington 
Consensus which claim to have a universal template of reforms and conditions that have to be met 
regardless of the country-specific conditions, the Beijing Consensus proponents put emphasis on trial-
and-error experimentation. As we will see in the following section with the African situation, 
countries experiment and adopt those policies that succeed and abandon those policies that fail. There 
is no need for a general theory of reform (Huang 2010, 38). 
 
The model of development described in the Beijing consensus, especially in the light of its self-
determination theorem and its base on a strictly classical concept of sovereignty, may be of particular 
interest for other developing countries. Interestingly, it does not consider any concrete degree of 
political liberalisation, let alone democratisation, as a necessary link to economic growth and 
development. Furthermore, the Chinese case proves that economic reform and liberalization do not 
necessarily result in democratic reform. In fact, China is an example of an authoritarian political 
regime with a technocratic approach to governance which incorporates interventionist economic 
policies and places strong emphasis not only on the achievement of economic growth but also on the 
maintenance of social stability (Abad 2010, 49). The Beijing Consensus’ focus on autonomy and self-
determination is not just a reaction to Western hegemony of international liberalism; it is 
fundamentally different in an epistemological sense. It is both pragmatic and ideological in nature, as 
it contains many ideas about politics, quality of life and the global balance of power, but it does not 
deduce a universally applicable model from those ideas, leaving room for localization of globalization 
practices. The Beijing Consensus cannot be interpreted as a coherent ideology, a set model of values 
and institutions, like international liberalism (Dams and van der Putten 2015, 17).After seeing how 
China’s economy grew despite the country not having liberalized people asked a number of questions. 
Why should China or any other country adopt the recommendations of the Washington Consensus? If 
state ownership of firms promotes economic growth, why privatize? If the one-party system works 
well in generating growth in gross domestic product (GDP), why democratize? If state financial 
controls are effective in resource mobilization, why liberalize? (Huang 2010, 31).Below, we will see 
how the China’s model has inspired many African nations. 
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III. China is regarded as a worthy alternative order by some African nations 
Unlike Western donors, China’s official policy statement on its trade and aid relationship with African 
countries states that as a first principle, China “respects African countries’ choice in political system 
and development path suited to their own national conditions; China does not interfere in internal 
affairs of African countries, and supports them in their just struggles for safeguarding their 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.” (Condon 2012, 17).Chinese leaders argue that 
since China does not accept any country imposing its values, social systems and ideology upon China, 
neither will China allow itself to do so to others (Bosshard 2008, 1). Guijin Liu said: “We [China] 
have never, and will never in the future, attach any kind of political conditions to […] aid and 
development projects, because we think that providing assistance is just for the benefit of the people, it 
is not for political purposes.”(Power and Mohan 2010, 18). China simultaneously wants to avoid 
Western donors’ failures that led to impoverishment in some African countries.  
 
The Chinese model is an attractive alternative for those authoritarian leaders who may want to 
improve the growth and development rates of their countries without challenging their single party 
rule, making economic development a priority over political reform. At the same time, judging by the 
Chinese case, these authoritarian leaders will enjoy some legitimacy as long as they achieve certain 
economic development and welfare for a greater number, regardless of the political line they may 
follow (Abad 2010, 50). Due to the attractiveness of China’s model in Africa, Chinese investment in 
Africa has been growing profitably in an unprecedented manner. Chinese investors are interested in 
physical infrastructure, industry and agriculture. China’s infrastructural development has been 
supported by African politicians who are desperate to show their successes (Shelton and Kabemba 
2012, 235). Afrodad 2010 maintains that there has rarely been as rapid and intense investment in 
African infrastructure as is going on today with Chinese investors. In fact, China is dispelling the myth 
that Africa cannot develop (Shelton and Kabemba 2012, 235).To some African leaders, China’s model 
is simply more beneficial than what was on offer from the West. Former Senegalese president A. 
Wade 2008, 2 said: 
 
With direct aid, credit lines and reasonable contracts, China has helped African nations 
build infrastructure projects in record time - bridges, roads, schools, hospitals, dams, 
legislative buildings, stadiums and airports… I have found that a contract that would 
take five years to discuss, negotiate and sign with the World Bank and the IMF, takes 
three months when we have dealt with Chinese authorities. I am a firm believer in good 
governance and the rule of law. But when bureaucracy and senseless red tape impede 
our ability to act - and when poverty persists while international functionaries drag their 
feet - African leaders have an obligation to opt for swifter solutions. 
 
To facilitate and evaluate the effectiveness of China-Africa relations, a Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) has been established. It serves as a means by which China can advance a 
position of moral relativism regarding human rights to a mostly sympathetic audience, consolidating 
its standing within African élite circles. A communique released after 2000 FOCAC asserted that 
“countries, that vary from one another in social system, stages of development, historical and cultural 
background and values, have the right to choose their own approaches and models in promoting and 
protecting human rights in their own countries” (FMPRC 2000, 104). Going further, the declaration 
made the claim that ‘the politicization of human rights and the imposition of human rights 
conditionalities’ themselves ‘constitute a violation of human rights’ and that conditionalities for 
development assistance which are based on good governance and respect for human rights ‘should be 
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vigorously opposed’. All this was music to the ears of many African leaders seated in the hall in 
Beijing, no doubt, and all arguably crafted as a means to promote an ‘alternative’ global order (Taylor 
2010, 191).  
 
China now gives more loans to Africa than the World Bank. During a FOCAC summit in 
Johannesburg, President Xi Jinping revealed that USD 60 billion China loaned Africa in 2015 would 
be zero-interest. China is now Africa’s largest trading partner, deepening their trade relations 
impressively. Nowadays, if a country is not happy with conditions it can easily turn the offer away 
because there are other available options to consider. In 2004, the IMF required Angola to reduce its 
corruption before it could award any financial assistance. Unexpectedly then, China’s Exim Bank also 
came forward with an offer to provide USD 2 billion worth of loans, without any conditionality 
regarding corruption or transparency attached. Angola finally turned down the IMF assistance and 
agreed to provide China with 40,000 barrels of oil per day (Condon 2012, 8). This loan led the 
Angolan government to repair infrastructure damaged by civil war spanning 27-years that had 
formally ended in 2002. Critics commented that this money allowed the Angolan government to 
escape transparency (27). Condon argues that these large, unconditional, and very cheap Chinese loans 
disbursed without concern for transparency or accountability, are certainly problematic, especially 
when they are given to autocratic governments lording over oil and mines (9). 
 
There are a number of advantages associated with Chinese model of development in Africa. When 
financial guarantees are largely unavailable, natural resource supplies are exchanged for infrastructure 
in a manner called the “Angola Mode of investment.”(Hsueh and Nelson 2015, 9). Chinese 
intervention, which is built upon direct responsibility for infrastructure development, is proving to be 
far more effective than western intervention. Much of the funding that the West sends to some African 
nations (whether through multilateral or bilateral cooperation) is misappropriated by corrupt local 
leaders and ends up in European banks. Following the Chinese approach, money, which would have 
been paid as taxes, is put straight into infrastructure development. This has prevented money from 
going into the pockets of corrupt officials (Shelton and Kabemba 2012, 139). In the past, the people of 
Africa were excluded from benefiting from mineral resources mostly because of elite corruption. 
Today, each country engaged with China is in a tangible progress for the new mode of development. 
 
However, some leaders from developing countries are already wondering whether China is truly 
committed to its non-interference policy. The Chinese ambassador to Zambia in 2006 warned that 
Beijing might cut off diplomatic ties if Zambians voted Sata as their president because he openly 
criticized Chinese exploitative activities in Zambia. Similarly, while many might agree that good 
governance cannot be externally imposed, some African scholars argue that Chinese leaders keep 
repeating the misleading statement that China does not interfere in the internal affairs of the countries 
it deals with. These scholars maintain that this non-interference statement is untrue. It is indeed 
provocative and insulting to many Africans who are aspiring for further democratic values. China 
interferes deeply in the domestic affairs of its partners, but always to the benefit of the ruling group. 
Even if China were to maintain exclusive economic relations with African countries, this would still 
inevitably have an effect on internal politics (Askouri and Campell2007, 73). Chinese themselves are 
well aware that their non-interference stance is untenable in Africa. Non-interference is a principle that 
is breaking down as evidenced by the emerging strategy of “proactive non-interference” that China 
adopts in some countries. As Chinese interests are changing, China’s support of sovereignty may be 
changing too. In June 2007, as a member of the UNSC, China persuaded the Sudanese government to 
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accept UN Resolution 1769, which empowered UN troops to use ‘all necessary means’ to protect 
themselves, defend civilians and secure the safe passage of aid (Dams and van der Putten 2015,  17). 
 
China has been also blamed for its relationships with shaky governments. Western critics contend that 
China’s African agenda are driven by its narrow self-interests and thus often undermine their efforts to 
promote regional peace, economic growth and democratization (Shelton and Kabemba 2012, 34). 
Hsueh and Nelson 2015 maintain that China’s deals help support some of the worst regimes on the 
continent, thereby undermining the ability of the West to reform governance in Africa, and instead 
represent a new attempt to colonize Africa (2). This leads to backsliding on democratic consolidation. 
Given the linkage between weak governance and conflict (Collier 2008), China’s political aid and 
commercial relations with corrupt or patronage-based regimes inadvertently consolidate or exacerbate 
cycles of underdevelopment, insecurity and conflict (Saferworld 2011, 29). However, this does not 
necessarily mean that if it were a democratic nation it would act differently. In reality, some Western 
democratic nations did worse simply because of their double standards.  The West, which conditions 
its loans on initiatives like democracy promotion and corruption reduction, has labeled China a ‘rogue 
donor,’ whose actions will damage Africa in the long run (Condon 2012, 8). Although Condon 
criticizes China’s support of unaccountability, he suggests that the West needs some humility in 
admitting that it has not been getting development in Africa right, either (19).  
 
 
China’s leaders have until now found ways for their country to exist and even to thrive in a world 
where liberal values play a significant role. Yet as China becomes a global power, the question should 
be asked as to whether China might use its influence to diminish the role of liberal values at the 
international level. Indeed, as China’s influence in Africa shows, China’s rise –in the words of Edward 
Friedman – has enabled it ‘to contribute to a roll-back of democracy globally’. Western liberal 
democracy is already in crisis; the West needs to respond to the challenge posed by the authoritarian 
state models of China (Dams and van der Putten 2015, 6). China sees an underlying ideological 
interest in Africa, as the success of the ‘China model’ in non-democratic African countries offers 
indirect support for its own political ideology. The more countries identify with and adopt Beijing’s 
approach, the less isolated China feels. Beijing would like to see non-Western, non-democratic 
governments grow and prosper in Africa, simply because they help validate China’s political system 
and mitigate its international isolation by showing that Western democracy is neither a universal 
value, nor fit for every country. Therefore, any success of authoritarian governments in Africa may be 
seen as constituting support for the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. The rate at which 
China is growing economically and its model being embraced in different parts of the world makes 
one wonder whether China is headed at providing a new narrative and alternative in IR.  
 
IV. China’s peaceful rise/development: A new narrative and alternative in IR? 
The conventional theoretical approaches used to understand IR, especially hegemonic stability theory, 
have been witnessing consistent problems arising both from the experiences of the current hegemon -
the US- and the challenge posed by the rise of China, a power which is increasingly willing and able 
to project and promote its historical and cultural position in the East Asian region through community 
building and soft power or simply 'peaceful rise (hepingjueqi)' (Cheung 2008, 6).In China, the use of 
soft power to facilitate the peaceful rise of China has gained momentum. China's patience, confidence, 
and rising economic power translate into a growing pool of ''soft'' power, giving China increasing 
influence in East Asia, in Africa and the global economic system. The Chinese language, along with 
globally established Confucian values, is gradually being accepted as symbols of Chinese soft power. 
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China’s proclamation regarding a “harmonious world” and its commitment to a “peaceful rise,” are 
identified as the conceptual pillars of an alternative model of the international system that could serve 
as a blueprint for other state actors (Yan 2008, 159). The peaceful rise is manifested via business and 
trade deals, Confucianism, soft power and East Asian education cooperation rather than more 
traditional mechanisms of war and military alliances (Cheung 2008, 6). Kurlantzick 2008 argued: 
“China's soft power indeed has proven successful in many cities [in East Asia and far beyond], 
allowing China in some cases to supplant the United States as the major external cultural and 
economic influence” (107). China is perceived by many to be destined for hegemonic status, at—and 
possibly beyond—the regional level (Buzan 2014). Gries2005 maintain that there is a general feeling 
that “China's sun will rise as America's sets” (406). China’s peaceful rise will further open its 
economy so that its population can serve as a growing market for the rest of the world, thus providing 
increased opportunities for – rather than posing a threat to – the international community (Zheng 2005, 
24).  
 
China seeks to build positive relationships with current and potential great powers to facilitate the 
emergence of a multipolar world order and to deny the US the opportunity to construct a coalition to 
contain China and prevent its continued rise. By properly managing relations with the US, other great 
powers, and developing countries, Chinese leaders hope to take advantage of the period of strategic 
opportunity to build China’s comprehensive national power and improve China’s international 
position (Saunders 2008, 128). The Chinese government has often expressed concern about the rise of 
an unchallenged hegemon, maintaining the opinion that in the current international system it is 
imperative that China and the developing world support each other and work together to prevent the 
over-domination by this US hegemony. Asserting that respect for each other’s affairs and non-
interference should be the basis of any new international order is fundamental to this stance, as is a 
policy of accommodating, and hedging risks with, the USA when deemed appropriate (Taylor 2010, 
189). As we also saw above China put its own economic development as top priority, and deduced 
from that the need for stability in its international relations both regionally and globally (Buzan 2010, 
12). Moreover, China is not merely trying to use its new economic power to transform its political 
status from that of a third world country to that of a Great Power. In addition to catching up to the 
West economically, China now aims to narrow the ''normative gap'' in international relations theory' 
(Callahan 2004, 570). Buzan 2014 thinks that peaceful rise/development is a unique idea for China’s 
grand strategy. Peaceful rise could mark the end of the Western dominated era of warlike rise, and the 
move to a new model of IR (40). 
 
Despite China’s peaceful rise, Ikenberry2011 thinks that a fundamental alternative to liberalism is 
nowhere to be found. Those who follow a liberal perspective argue that liberalism will prove to be the 
end of history. In this view, although China certainly comes from a different past, its future is liberal, 
in which it will accept economic and political norms based on liberalism, and institutions as 
universally true and applicable, by the virtue of reason. Within this liberal framework, it might be 
expected that China will change the international order in practice, while adopting liberalism in 
theoretical essence. China’s rise would thus be part of the evolution of the system, rather than the end 
of it (Dams and van der Putten 2015, 11).Ikenberry goes on to argue that China will continue to 
accommodate what he calls the ‘liberal international order’, because ultimately this provides it with 
greater benefits than if it tries to change this order(Ikenberry 2011, 57-8).It may be possible for China 
to overtake the United States alone, but it is much less likely that China will ever manage to overtake 
the Western order. The US may be weakened, but China has to comply with the established world 
order created by the US and its partners. China is a follower after all (Ikenberry2008, 37). 
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According to Ikenberry, China and other emerging great powers do not want to contest the basic rules 
and principles of the liberal international order; they wish to gain more authority and leadership within 
it. Indeed, today’s power transition represents not the defeat of the post-1945 world order, in which 
liberalism plays a major role, but its ultimate ascendance (Ikenberry 2011, 57).There are several 
reasons for this liberal international order to persist. First, the period since 1945 is the longest period 
of ‘great power peace’ in modern history. This is because of the dominance of democracy, assuming 
that democratic countries are less likely to wage war in general and especially on one another, and 
because of nuclear deterrence, which raises the cost of war. It would not be in any party’s interest to 
disrupt such a peaceful order. Second, the liberal international order is ‘easy to join and hard to 
overturn’. Multilateral institutions bear a relatively low threshold for entry and provide great economic 
and political gains. Finally, like other emerging powers, China does not pose a fundamentally different 
alternative to the existing international order. Indeed, China is becoming increasingly more compatible 
with norms based on liberalism and is becoming integrated into the existing world order (Ikenberry 
2010, 514-515).  
 
There are a number of counter-arguments that have been made against Ikenberry and those in his 
camp. China seems to have little sense of duty to promote liberalism; rather, China feels that it is, at 
the moment, to its benefit to partake in it. To argue that China integrates into the international order 
for the sake of liberalism would be to reason the wrong way around: China will be compatible with 
norms based on liberalism as long as such norms are compatible with Chinese interests. China is not 
integrating into the liberal international order because it shares the liberal ideology, but because it 
serves China’s needs (Dams and van der Putten 2015, 13). Ginsburg seems to challenge Ikenberry’s 
argument by arguing that “Only if Asia’s political preferences and infant regional institutions 
magically transformed into mirrors of Europe would we expect an Asia-centred economic order to 
converge with the European model of politics and law. This outcome seems highly unlikely” 
(Ginsburg 2010, 28). 
 
Consequently, China will turn out to be a radically different kind of superpower than any that we have 
seen so far, with its rise bringing a fundamentally different ideological system to the table. Such a 
theory rejects the assumption of the universality of liberal values and puts forward a communitarian 
approach to the theory and practice of international political order, relying on notions of Chinese 
essentialism (Dams and van der Putten 2015, 11). In The End of the End of History, Kagan argues that 
the re-emergence of the great autocratic powers like China has weakened liberal order, and threatens 
to weaken it further in the years and decades to come. The world’s democracies need to begin thinking 
about how they can protect their interests and advance their principles in a world in which they are, 
once again, powerfully contested. A new international order based on illiberal values might replace the 
current liberal order, leading to a paradigmatic shift in international politics. 
 
Although China does not confront liberalism with a counter-ideology, it does approach the actual or 
potential norm of promoting liberal values with the counter-norm of international diversity. The 
central idea in the latter concept is that respect for differences between countries in terms of their 
political and economic systems is a fundamental precondition for a stable and morally just 
international system (Dams and van der Putten 2015, 18). Chinese policy in this regard has been 
consistently to cast talk of liberal democracy and liberal conceptions of human rights as a tool of neo-
imperialism being practiced towards both China and the developing world. The Chinese approach of 
reforming the economy while limiting political freedom represents a new development model with 
considerable appeal to authoritarian leaders in developing countries (Saunders 2008, 139). Ayodele 
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and Sotola2014 are convinced that China’s economic rise is shaping the international order by 
introducing a new development paradigm in international relations which demonstrates that economic 
growth could be brought about by any type of government, democratic or nondemocratic (3). China is 
forging a path for other developing countries across the world that wish to develop their economies 
following the international order as a way to be truly independent and protect their political choices. 
China clearly shows that economic development and finance can in fact be led by the State. Tom 
Friedman, “One-party non-democracy certainly has its drawbacks. But when it is led by a reasonably 
enlightened group of people, as China is today, it can also have great advantages. That one party can 
just impose the politically difficult but critically important policies needed to move a society forward 
in the 21st century.” The discussion on Africa proves that a Chinese model has become a legitimate 
challenger to the Western status-quo providing an alternative to the unhealthy economic dependency 
which has grown between Africa and its former colonial masters. Tull2016 suggests that China is not 
just an alternative, but is arguably a better choice for Africa. 
 
It is noteworthy that domestic problems, social inequality, environmental degradation, and periodic 
political clampdowns could also limit China’s attractiveness as a model for others to emulate 
(Saunders 2008, 139).Despite the dramatic economic growth achieved, China has the highest 
inequality in the world. The issue of inequality in China is alarming. It is one of the highest in the 
world today. Gini coefficient is normally calculated between zero – which means there is no inequality 
– to 1 – where inequality is high. China’s Gini coefficient was 0.465 in 2016. The World Bank 
estimates that a country with a Gini Coefficient of 0.40 has a severe form of inequality. (Griffin and 
Renwei 2016, 6) Since 1990s China’s Gini coefficient has been high. The richer are getting richer 
while the poor are getting poorer. A number of these rich people are from the ruling party. Around 
35% of the 500 richest people in China– all of them multi-millionaires or even billionaires – are 
members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Li 2009, 8). 
 
Despite the fact that China has been an autocratic state, some scholars think that it will democratize at 
some point. According to modernization theory, China with its economic development today should 
democratize or is on the way to democratizing. There is no way it will avoid this natural process 
through which other developed and democratic nations have passed. According to the modernization 
theory, democracy is a product of economic development. Democracies are more likely to emerge as 
countries become economically developed. In other words, development comes first and democracy 
follows suit. Chen argues that “development first, democracy later” theorists believe that if we 
consider that democracy should be supported by some preconditions, economic growth just creates 
these necessary for democracy—industrialization, urbanization, widespread of education and literacy, 
wealth, and a strong middle class who concern with the protection of their rights (16). Martin Jacques 
argues in his famous book When China Rules the World that “Chinese democracy will share certain 
universal characteristics with democracies elsewhere, but will also of necessity be highly distinctive, 
expressive of its roots in Chinese society and traditions” (Jacques 2009, 220).  
 
China has started a very slow process of democratization. In September 2009, the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) called for promoting democracy within the Party and intensifying the anticorruption drive 
within the leadership. The dominant theme of 2009 CCP meeting was “intra-Party democracy 
“dangneiminzhu.” China’s top leaders characterized intra-Party democracy as the “lifeblood” of the 
Party (Li 2009, 2). While there was no breakthrough decision in 2009, there was a wide-ranging plan 
for improvements to CCP governing. The directives explicitly called for political reforms in five major 
areas: 1) more competitive inner-Party elections to choose CCP officials; 2) a more consensus based 
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decision-making process called “decision by votes” (piaojuezhi); 3) more restrictive rules to regulate 
the tenure, transfer, and regional allocation of high-ranking leaders; 4) a multi-dimensional 
supervision system to restrain official corruption and other forms of power abuses; and 5) a new 
emphasis on the transparency of Party affairs (7).Li 2009 believes that inner-Party democracy is not 
true democracy, but it may pave the way for Chinese democracy in a broader sense (6). 
 
The rise of China will put forward a fundamentally different set of norms in global governance, but it 
will not challenge liberalism in the sense that communism did in the Cold War. The opposite is the 
case: although China rejects any ideological universalism in an epistemological sense, and acts from 
this belief, it accepts that norms based on liberalism are a part of the pluralist international order, albeit 
with its national interests in mind. Rather than countering liberalism with an alternative, homological 
grand narrative, China’s ideological strategy is pragmatic and based on seeking legitimization of its 
actions through specific and localized rhetoric (Dams and van der Putten 2015, 17). 
 
Conclusion 
For now there may be no clear and distinct Chinese IR theory. But the progress that China has made 
economically and the influence it has had during the past 30 years on the rest of the world shows that 
China is set for challenging the current liberal order which has stood for decades. China’s approach is 
pragmatic and has thus accommodated liberal ideas and worldview each time it benefits from doing 
so. Consequently, China may not disrupt the liberal order but it will draw from it what serves its 
interest and keep challenging what contradicts its grand strategy of peaceful rise. China’s model shows 
that it is possible to achieve dramatic economic growth without necessarily embracing liberal 
democracy and other conditionalities that were embedded in the Washington Consensus and that are 
imposed by Western states to developing world. The Beijing Consensus, China’s peaceful 
rise/development may not be fully-fledged alternative to the Washington Consensus but certainly it 
sets a new tone and a new narrative in IR and seriously challenges the status quo. In many developing 
countries, China has found followers of its development and political model. China will not challenge 
the existing order through violent ways like other would-be hegemonies did. Through a peaceful 
rise/development China will become a new hegemony and with its soft power it will regulate and rule 
the world. China’s grand strategy challenges from all angles the idea of viewing the world from a 
realist perspective of conflict and the use of force. The way China’s model has gained momentum 
proves that it will be a mistake to silence voices beyond the European-Atlantic hemisphere. Once that 
is done it will be to adopt an intellectual colonization of non-Western people. IR is richer when it is 
diverse and does not ignore other voices no matter how small and weak they may be. As we wait for 
the Kuhnian paradigm shift in IR theories, it is high time Western voices accommodate new voices not 
just from China but from beyond to engage them in a discourse. 
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